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The  trade  and  capital  flows  across  the  national  borders  of  developing  countries  have 
recently accelerated and produced the conditions for faster transmission of knowledge. 
While  the  economic  literature  has  mainly  focused  on  how  international  technology 
transfer affects standard economic performance, less attention has been paid to a broader 
development  perspective.  This  paper  fills  this  gap  by  addressing  two  main  issues.  It 
investigates whether the technology transfer conveyed by international trade flows has 
positively influenced the development paths of developing countries. It also focuses on 
whether country-specific structural features and institutional quality support the positive 
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1. Introduction 
The globalization process has led to a greater integration of developing countries in the 
world economy. The flows of trade, capital, labour, technology, and information across 
their national borders have accelerated in recent decades and produced the conditions for 
faster  economic  growth  and  transmission  of  knowledge.  However,  the  distribution  of 
these  positive  impulses  among  countries  is  far  from  being  homogeneous  and  heavily 
depends on structural domestic characteristics. 
Even though the role of international relations in enhancing economic growth has been 
recognized  (Dollar  and  Kraay,  2004),  many  more  controversies  in  the  scientific  and 
political debate arise when a more general development framework is adopted (Milanovic, 
2006). The impact of globalization on income distribution and social development may be 
strongly uneven depending on the domestic capacity to transform economic integration 
into development opportunities (Deaton, 2005; Stern and Deardorff, 2006). 
Focusing on the specific processes of technology and knowledge diffusion related to 
global integration, there is a growing consensus on the positive role of both trade and 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows as potential channels of knowledge transfer (Hu 
and Jaffe, 2007; Saggi, 2000), and as an engine for economic growth (Hansen and Rand, 
2006). As earlier contributions by Coe and Helpman (1995) and Eaton and Kortum (1996) 
have emphasized, international knowledge spillovers are crucial factors in explaining the 
growth performance of advanced economies, with trade and FDI representing important 
channels for these spillovers. 
However, the relative importance of these transmission channels is far from being fully 
identified. This lack of knowledge limits the understanding of the proper role of policy 
settings  in  facilitating  international  technology  transfer,  especially  for  developing 
countries,  because  specific  national  features  assume  a  greater  role  in  explaining  the 
capacity to adopt the imported knowledge. According to Lall (2000), the positive effects of 
economic integration for the underdeveloped world are strongly influenced by the quality 
content of trade and FDI flows, not only in absolute values, but also with regard to the 
consistency between the type of knowledge transfer and the capacity to absorb it. 
The  knowledge-capital  model  developed  by  Markusen  and  Maskus  (2002)  has 
suggested that knowledge capital has a public good property because it can be used in 
multiple  locations  simultaneously.  This  property  suggests  that  the  role  of  the  public 
sector, as the leading factor of catching opportunities from a globalized world, may have 
been overlooked in empirical settings whereas it could significantly help underpin the 
knowledge  absorptive  capacity  of  less  developed  economies.  Moreover,  while  most 
contributions have concentrated on the impact of technology transfer on economic growth 
and  productivity  performances,  the  importance  of  technology  diffusion  in  a  broader 
definition of economic development, as for instance represented by human development 
achievements, has been addressed less frequently. 
Within this framework, this paper will address three major points. The first point is to 
what extent the accumulation of technology transferred from rich to poor countries via 
international flows has influenced the dynamics of development of these latter countries. 
The  second  point  concerns  the  weight  of  the  productive  structure  similarity  between 
technology-producing and technology-adopting countries on the capacity of the latter to 
transform foreign innovation into development opportunities. The third point is related to 
whether the pro-development effect of technology transfer is affected by the institutional 
quality of the receiving country.   6 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a literature 
review mainly focusing on contribution related to technology transfer and development. 
Section 3 describes the modelling strategy, while in Section 4, we propose some original 
changes to the measurement of technology transfer with respect to the absorptive capacity 
of developing countries and the econometric strategy. Section 5 provides empirical results 
and Section 6 provides some conclusive remarks. 
 
 
2. International technology transfer, development and institutions 
Productivity  differences  account  for  a  large  part  of  the  variation  in  incomes  across 
countries  and  technology  plays  a  key  role  in  determining  productivity.  For  most 
countries, foreign sources of technology are estimated to account for 90% of domestic 
productivity growth (Keller, 2009). 
Most  of  the  world’s  technology  creation  occurs  in  developed  countries;  thus, 
technology transfer seems to be crucial for those countries with strong constraints to 
technology creation, as in most developing countries. As emphasized in Keller (1996), in 
the  current  wave  of  economic  integration  and  outward-oriented  policies  adopted  by 
developing countries, it is important to assess the influence that international relations 
can have on economic growth and development of the followers. 
Since the pattern of technological change is determined in large part by the diffusion of 
international  technology,  the  still  ongoing  and  enhancing  integration  process  of  the 
underdeveloped  side  of  the  world  into  the  global  economic  system  could  lead  to 
substantial  gains  for  domestic  systems  where  marginal  productivity  gains  related  to 
technology transfer for the developing countries may be rather higher than achievements 
obtained in the developed world. 
To  some  extent,  the  likelihood  that  technologies  produced  abroad  may  positively 
influence  domestic  production  capacity  is  strictly  dependent  on  the  actual  absorptive 
capacity  of  the  adopter  country.  The  diffusion  of  technology  involves  both  market 
transactions and externalities.1 Although obtaining information on the former is simpler 
through royalty payments for the use of patents, licenses, copyrights, many researchers 
believe that the most effective channel of technology diffusion is given by externalities.2 
Externalities, however, may be received differently in developed and developing countries. 
In  developed  economies,  FDI  seems  to  be  preferred  as  a  potential  vehicle  favouring 
externalities  since  face-to-face  contacts  or  procedural  production  standards  may 
encompass transfer problems related to the tacit nature of technology (Gholami et al., 
2006; Markusen and Venables, 1999; Saggi, 2000). In developing countries, on the other 
hand, the role of trade flows as a vehicle of knowledge transfer seems to prevail for three 
main reasons (Coe et al., 1997). First, international trade favours an expanding variety of 
                                                 
1 We use the term “international technology diffusion” or “technology transfer” or “technological transfer” 
when  referring  to  the  movement  of  technological  knowledge  from  firms  or  sectors  located  in  different 
countries.  This  diffusion  consists  of  arms-length  market  transactions  and  externalities  or  international 
technology spillovers. Technology diffusion is one factor, but not the only one, that can affect productivity. 
The term “diffusion” is more related to a wider effect not only strictly related to the productive sector 
whereas the term “transfer” may suggest a more intentional approach (Keller, 2009). Throughout the paper, 
we will use diffusion and transfer synonymously, where a broader diffusion concept is implicitly assumed. 
2 The literature on market failures explaining the emergence of technology spillover is quite extensive and 
rich, and exhaustive treatment here is far from the aim of this paper. Our focus is rather to understand 
which are the major constraints to diffusion and the adoption path of foreign technology, or which are the 
most significant drivers enforcing such a diffusion process.   7 
intermediate  goods  and  capital  equipment  available  for  domestic  productions.  Second, 
trade encourages the availability of information on production processes, product design, 
managerial methods and contract design that would otherwise be extremely costly to be 
acquired  domestically.  Third,  international  trade  may  help  copy  foreign  technologies 
embedded in traded goods or adapt them for local use. 
All these channels may be strengthened or weakened by the existence or the absence of 
some structural characteristics of the country (or firms). For example, the literature on 
standard  technology  transfer  in  developed  countries  (Madsen,  2007)  suggests  that 
international  knowledge  diffusion  is  more  likely  when  certain  ancillary  conditions  are 
satisfied. Relying on the seminal work by Nelson and Phelps (1966), human capital has 
been  recognized  as  one  of  the  leading  factors  explaining  the  capacity  to  transform 
imported  technology  into  productivity  gains  (Engelbrecht,  1997;  Keller,  2004).  Keller 
(1996) has also emphasized that the long-run benefits from economic integration into a 
global market are more likely to occur depending on to which extent the human capital 
formation  is  progressively  adapted  to  changes  in  technologies  embodied  in  imported 
goods.3  In  a  broad  sense,  technology  transfer  is  more  likely  to  influence  economic 
performance  positively  if  a  proper  national  system  of  innovation  provides  a  good 
environment for diffusion and adoption processes (Malerba, 2002, 2006), and this is also 
valid for developing countries (Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008). All these features can be 
synthesized  into  the  ‘absorptive  capacity’  concept  developed  by  the  seminal  works  of 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990). 
When  focusing  on  developing  countries,  these  ancillary  conditions  may  turn  into 
necessary  conditions  allowing  embedded  technology  to  be  exploited  for  development 
purposes. In other words, to facilitate the diffusion of related benefits, the nature of public 
good implicit in the notion of technology requires additional conditions in less advanced 
countries, where a broad range of potential positive effects on well-being may assume 
relevance other than productivity gains and income growth (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 
2002).4 
To  this  purpose,  we  propose  three  ancillary  –  and  to  some  extent  necessary  – 
conditions for amplifying the role of technology transfer for development purposes. The 
first is a condition of economic similarity, by which the closer the economic structure of the 
receiving country is to the corresponding structure of the trading partner (the technology 
exporter), the higher the likelihood that the embedded technology is consistent with the 
absorptive  capacity  of  the  importing  country  (Conley  and  Ligon,  2002;  Franco  et  al., 
2009). The basic tenet of this condition is that the probability of innovation to spill from 
one country to another strictly depends on the concentration of economic activity in a 
particular  sector  in  the  two  countries  (Boschma  and  Frenken,  2009;  Boschma  and 
                                                 
3 This implies that given a certain amount of a globally available technology stock, each country will benefit 
more from using it as input in the economic system, the more consistent the human capital stock is with this 
input.  Coe  et  al.  (1997)  test  this  hypothesis  by  interacting  human  capital  formation  –  defined  by  the 
secondary gross enrolment ratio – in a panel with 77 countries. Their results provide a robust empirical 
evidence to this notion, recently supported also by Mayer (2001). 
4 For example, the availability of information and communication technologies imported from abroad may 
affect education or health achievements, whereas specific innovation produced by the pharmaceutical sector 
may help poor countries to drastically reduce health diseases (Bloom, 2009). These positive effects are more 
likely  to  occur  if  the  local  government  is  well  equipped  (among  others)  in  terms  of  human  capital, 
administrative rules, legal systems, supportive infrastructures, etc.   8 
Iammarino, 2009, among others), suggesting that cognitive proximity may help explain 
the existence and the strength of innovation spillovers.5 
The second is a consistency condition between the technological content of the imported 
goods and the development level of the receiving country. Although the economic similarity 
condition allows the absorptive capacity of each economic sector to be better evaluated it 
can  be  insufficient  to  explain  the  actual  capacity  of  importing  countries  to  exploit 
development opportunities embodied in imported technologies. This information is best 
recovered by disaggregating the flows of technology transferred from rich countries at a 
sector  level  according  to  a  technological  ladder  classification.  The  basic  idea  is  that 
technology transfer cannot be homogeneously distributed among manufacturing sectors 
that are differentiated by their technological content, and this is more likely to occur in 
developing countries. The power of a sector-based analysis to shed light on the innovation 
and  technology  diffusion  patterns  has  been  recently  recognized  for  both  developed 
countries (Acharya and Keller, 2009; Ulku, 2007) and developing countries, where it is 
suggested that export performances and comparative advantages can be strictly related to 
the relative technological content of productive sectors (Lall, 2000). 
The third is an institutional quality condition. Institutional quality is a crucial factor that 
influences development and technology transfer. A first (and rather standard) channel of 
influence  would  refer  to  the  direct  impact  that  good  or  bad  institutions  may  have  on 
relevant  economic  variables.  In  analogy  with  an  older  classification  developed  by 
Krugman (1993) – with reference to the role played by geography in explaining cross-
country income differences – one can define this effect as the absolute impact. According to 
the prevailing literature, this impact would develop through the action of either formal key 
variables (such as the degree of control of property rights, the degree of corruption, the 
height of transactions costs, the rules of law, the level of political instability, the intensity 
of  legal  and  civic  norms,  etc.)  or,  more  rarely,  informal  relationships  (such  as  caste, 
ethnicity and trust, reputation, etc.). 
In both cases, the main conclusion is that good institutions facilitate the growth of per 
capita incomes.6 While in principle this may be the result of both formal and informal 
structures, formal institutions may be more powerful in guaranteeing mostly anonymous 
exchanges,  especially  when  societies  become  more  complex  and  economies  more 
sophisticated (Luiz, 2009). To some extent, this notion is in line with the view by North 
(1990)  that  institutions  are  the  rules  of  the  game  that  may  be  conducive  to  desirable 
economic  behaviour  whereas  organisations  are  the  players.  On  the  contrary,  bad 
institutions  would  contribute  the  opposite,  with  the  additional  issue  that  they  would 
persist under the protection of those who stand to gain from their maintenance (Acemoglu 
et  al.,  2004).  Bhattacharya  et  al.  (2009)  also  observe  that  to  benefit  from  trade,  the 
institutional  quality  of  a  country  must  be  above  a  threshold  level.  Furthermore,  an 
improved institutional quality may help gain the full rewards of economic integration and 
foster economic convergence between rich and poor countries (Frankel and Romer, 1999). 
                                                 
5  This  assumption  relaxes  the  standard  assumption  of  abstracting  from  structural  differences  between 
countries, and thereby from the notion of comparative advantages. While valid when technology flows in 
countries  with  similar  development  levels,  this  assumption  seems  quite  restrictive  when  highly 
heterogeneous countries are scrutinized. Keller (1996) suggests that when ignoring such differences, the fact 
that the absorptive capacity of the receiving country may be affected by its relative specialization pattern 
with respect to the exporting countries is implicitly excluded. 
6 There is indeed widespread empirical support for the idea that institutions matter (or institutions rule) and 
that  the  quality  of  institutions  may  even  trump  geography  and  economic  integration  as  the  main 
determinant of growth or development (Pande and Udry, 2005; Rodrik et al., 2004).   9 
This  opens  the  issue  of  whether  institutions  are  important  per  se  or  as  a  vehicle  for 
transferring the benefits which are potentially embodied in economic exchanges.7 
Despite widespread attention to the role of institutions, the empirical evidence of their 
absolute impact is more often associated with the concept of economic growth rather than 
with economic development. Indeed, while it is common to find articles investigating the 
impact of institutions on the GDP per capita (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Alcalà and 
Ciccone, 2004; Glaeser et al., 2004), the output per worker (Hall and Jones, 1999), the ratio 
of investments to GDP (Bockstette et al., 2002; Clague et al., 1999; Knack and Keefer, 
1995;  Mauro,  1995;),  the  overall  size  of  the  public  sector  (La  Porta  et  al.,  1999),  the 
average  stock  market  capitalization  (Acemoglu  and  Johnson,  2005)  and  other  similar 
measures,  there  is  only  spare  empirical  evidence  on  the  impact  of  institutions  on 
development (variously measured), even though some recent research has emphasised that 
weak, missing or perverse institutions may be at the roots of underdevelopment (Shirley, 
2008). 
Even  less  common  is  literature  dealing  with  interactions  between  institutions  and 
other factors influencing development achievements, i.e. dealing with indirect rather than 
direct impacts. In particular (and this is the second channel of influence), we argue that the 
interaction between institutions and the environment in which they develop is crucial for 
transforming  endowments  and  imported  technologies  into  opportunities  (Bosker  and 
Garretsen, 2009; Coe et al., 2009).8 To some extent, since the complementary nature of 
technological change and human capital formation has been ascribed as a major factor 
inducing  developing  countries  to  adopt  and  efficiently  implement  technology  (Mayer, 
2001), higher levels of institutional capacity could also be considered as a complement to 
technological  innovation  for  reducing  the  development  gap.  First  empirical  evidence 
provided  by  Fagerberg  et  al.  (2007),  Fagerberg  and  Srholec  (2008),  and  Seck  (2011) 
reveals that stringent requirements are necessary for developing countries for getting the 
opportunities of being late comers and catching-up the leaders in their economic growth 
paths. More relevantly, the quality of governance, the character of the political system, as 
well  as  the  export  structure,  seem  to  appear  as  those  conditioning  variables  with  the 
highest positive impact on the catch-up process. 
 
 
3. Modelling strategy 
The practical implementation of the three ancillary conditions can be discussed by moving 
from the standard modelling approach used to define the effects of foreign technology on 
economic performance. In particular, for a country z, we can start from the Cobb-Douglas 
production function: 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) for an analysis of the interactions between institutional 
changes and skill-biased technologies. It should be observed that economic integration could also affect 
institutions (a position that introduces a causality issue in the analysis). In this regard, Rogowski (1989) 
argued that some domestic political alignments may in fact be determined by increased (and liberalised) 
trade relationships among countries. 
8 Coe et al. (2009), focusing on four dimensions of institutional quality in selected OECD countries such as 
the ease of doing business, the quality of tertiary education, the strength of intellectual property rights, and 
the origins of the legal systems, suggest that institutions influence the capacity of technology produced 
abroad to be used in domestic production. They also argue that a much wider heterogeneity emerges in the 
absorptive capacity when international knowledge spillovers are weighted by country-specific institutional 
quality. Such a result, valid for a selected and quite homogenous group of advanced countries, is reinforced 
when institutional quality influences the absorptive capacity of less developed countries (Seck, 2011).   10 
 
          (1) 
 
where  .  We  define  the  total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  as 
,  where  for  each  country  z  TFP  depends  on  the  exogenous 
residual ( ) as well as on a measure of the global knowledge stock T. By taking logs of 
the TFP, we obtain: 
 
         (2) 
 
In  a  symmetric  model  with  C  countries  and  no  trade  barriers,  in  equilibrium  all 
countries  may  employ  all  intermediate  goods  from  all  countries  produced  through 
national innovation efforts   (Keller, 2004). In symbols: 
 
          (3) 
 
where the global knowledge capital stock T is perfectly available for all potential users (a 
kind of public good). Coe and Helpman (1995), however, recognize that the most common 
case is one where there are both country heterogeneity and trade barriers; hence for each 
country z the range of possible intermediates is no longer given by T, but is a country-
specific global knowledge stock given by: 
 
         (4) 
 
where   is the domestic component of the knowledge stock (basically depending on the 
national production and technology), and   is the part of the knowledge stock produced 
outside  country  z  that  is  absorbed  by  that  same  country.  The  main  issue  here  is  to 
consider  a  vehicle  that  transforms  the  foreign  knowledge  stock  into  a  national 
endowment. Consistently with the literature discussed above, we assume that the impact 
of   on country z is mediated by trade, in particular by the import shares of country z 
( )  with  each  trading  partner  .  This  brings  to  assume    for 
 and  , where   is the vector of technology produced in each trading 
partner  . This implies that the global knowledge stock produced abroad is converted 
into national endowments according to the intensity of bilateral trade flows.9 
From (2), applying the decomposition (4), we have: 
 
        (5) 
 
                                                 
9 This formulation also captures country-specific features related to the relative position of each country in 
the international trade network as predicted by Grossman and Helpman (1991). If country z has relatively 
larger  import  shares  from  technologically  advanced  countries,  the  likelihood  of  receiving  technology 
embodied in intermediate goods will rise, improving domestic productivity.   11 
where   can be interpreted as a country-specific fixed effect whereas the second term 
on  the  right  hand  side  represents  the  overall  contribution  of  domestic  and  foreign 
technology to TFP. This way of modelling the TFP can in turn be used to investigate the 
impact of technology transfer on the whole production function. By taking logs of (1), 
using (5) and relaxing the assumption of a common   for both the domestic and the 
foreign component of  , it gives rise to: 
 
    (6) 
 
where   is the error term. 
This framework can easily be extended to include the effects of other factors on the 
dependent variable. Of particular importance here is the role of institutions. As described 
in the previous paragraph, institutions may have both a direct and an indirect impact. In 
our modelling strategy, the direct impact can be described as the autonomous effect that 
institutions may have on the productivity parameter (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997). The 
indirect impact, on the other hand, is best represented by the role that institutions may 
have in favouring the acquisition of global knowledge stock. While the first impact is 
modelled by an autonomous coefficient, the second impact, in our view, is best modelled as 
an interaction between institutions and global knowledge stock. 
Let us first consider the direct impact. One simple way to include institutional quality 
(I) in the previous framework is to augment the total factor productivity as follows: 
 
        (7) 
 
This  procedure,  in  turn,  gives  rise  to  an  estimation  procedure  that  includes  the 
autonomous impact of institutions: 
 
  (8) 
 
Alternatively,  we  can  assume  that  institutions  have  a  role  to  the  extent  that  they 
interact with the ability to absorb the global knowledge stock (the indirect impact), and 
that this role decreases in the level of institutional quality.10 In other words, the higher 
the quality of institutions, the lower their marginal impact on technology transfer, which 
is in fact a mild assumption. This assumption would require an extension of (1) as follows: 
 
  (9) 
 
This specification of the production function gives rise to the following econometric 
representation: 
 
  (10) 
 
Equations (8) and (10) give a general framework for analysing the impact of technology 
transfer  and  institutions  on  income  levels.  However,  as  discussed  in  the  previous 
                                                 
10 This approach is analogous to the case where human capital is used as a diffusion channel. See Coe et al. 
(1997).   12 
paragraph, developing countries may be interested in the impact that both factors have on 
a broad definition of well-being. One natural candidate to extend both equations to more 
comprehensive  measures  of  well-being  is  to  consider  the  Human  Development  Index 
(HDI). Following the seminal contributions by Sen (1979, 1982, 1983), while income is 
certainly one of the “strongest predisposing conditions for capability deprivation” (Sen, 
1997; 211), we must consider whether the income space alone could represent an adequate 
informational basis for the assessment of equity, social justice and development. The core 
of  Sen’s  argument  is  that  there  is  a  set  of  individual  capabilities  that  represents  the 
possibility of promoting and achieving individual functionings that overcome the narrow 
income space. This implies that income per capita and productivity gains are definitely a 
necessary  condition  for  development;  at  the  same  time,  other  aspects  which  are  not 
necessarily  embodied  in  the  concept  of  per  capita  income  should  be  considered 
fundamental aspects of human well-being. Even in the context of practical implementation 
difficulties, Sen’s approach has been decisive in developing a more comprehensive index of 
well-being such as the HDI, where income is associated to health and education levels as a 
determinant of well-being. In this context, satisfactory levels of income, education and 
health may be seen as functionings for developing countries (i.e. a way to develop), with 
institutional  quality  helping  the  capability  to  achieve  development  levels  through  its 
impact on technology transfer.11 
 
 
4. Measurement and econometric strategy 
Equations (8) and (10) are expressed on an income basis. Some adjustments are therefore 
needed  to  convert  it  on  a  human  development  basis  embodying  the  drivers  of  the 
development process and to catch other country-specific characteristics that can affect 
development goals. In particular, we identify a number of issues. The first is how to define 
the dependent variable HDI. The second is how to interpret the capital stock dimension in 
a development perspective which can influence both productivity gains and human well-
being.  The  third  is  how  to  embody  the  ancillary  conditions  for  development  into  the 
measurement of technology transfer; the fourth is how to measure institutional quality. 
 
 
4.1. The dependent variable in a development framework 
The dependent variable is here defined by the standard Human Development Index (HDI) 
in two different versions. The first takes four indicators into account whereas the second 
only considers three of them. In particular: 
 
  (11) 
 
  (12) 
 
                                                 
11 The quality of institutions can therefore be thought of as playing the role of agency (Robeyns, 2005).   13 
where   represents constant GDP per capita at PPP level,   is life expectancy at birth 
(number of years),   is adult literacy rate (%), and   is the gross enrolment ratio (% for 
primary and secondary schools).12 The second definition will therefore exclude the income 
dimension  of  the  human  development  in  order  to  potentially  disentangle  whether 
technology diffusion is more effective in influencing social rather than strictly economic 
dimensions of development.13 
This analytical choice is consistent with the results described in Ranis et al. (2000), 
where  mutual  causal  relationships  can  be  found  between  human  development  and 
economic growth. More importantly, higher performance in the economic dimension of 
HDI  may  be  associated  with  relatively  lower  achievements  for  the  other  two  ends 
(education  and  health)  revealing  the  role  of  income  distribution  as  a  crucial  factor  in 
influencing the capacity of a society to transform economic progress into widely diffused 
development  opportunities.  In  other  words,  when  the  second-type  HDI  is  scrutinized, 
economic  growth  is  included  in  the  explanatory  variables  (the  means)  as  a  factor 
influencing human development achievements (the ends). 
 
 
4.2. The measurement of infrastructural endowment 
The  strategy  followed  here  is  to  replace  private  capital  ( )  –  entering  the  standard 
production function of the private sector – with two variables emphasising the role of the 
public  sector,  i.e.  the  ratio  between  government  consumption  and  GDP  ( )  and  the 
availability of technological infrastructures ( ). Government consumption is chosen as a 
measure of public intervention since it satisfactorily approximates the amount of public 
resources devoted to in-kind benefits such as health, education and social assistance. In 
our perspective, by excluding pure monetary transfers, government consumption helps to 
quantify the role of the public sectors in improving functionings and it is therefore a useful 
variable  for  controlling  countries’  achievements.  The  measure  of  technological 
infrastructures (Jz) is instead built according to the methodology proposed by Archibugi 
and Coco (2004), which is also specifically designed to represent how well-functioning 
infrastructures improve individuals’ capabilities. In particular: 
 
    (13) 
 
with   now representing fixed and mobile telephone lines (per 1,000 persons),   the 
number of internet subscribers (per 1,000 persons), and   electricity consumption (per 
1,000 persons). This approach relies on the seminal work by Abramovitz (1986), where 
differences in countries’ abilities to exploit the potential to catch-up may be also explained 
by differences in social capabilities. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Unlike the HDI as calculated by the UNDP, the tertiary school enrolment ratio in the education index is 
excluded, since data availability is rather poor for a large panel of developing countries in a time series 
perspective. 
13 For the sake of simplicity, the temporal dimension is hidden from all mathematical formulation, but all 
variables are time variant if otherwise specified.   14 
4.3. The definition of technology transfer and ancillary conditions 
Starting  from  the  empirical  formulation  proposed  by  Coe  and  Helpman  (1995)  as 
expressed by eq. (4), we first relax the assumption that the absorptive capacity is not 
affected by domestic features. When dealing with developing countries, this assumption 
becomes restrictive since many imported goods enter as final rather than intermediate 
goods  in  the  production  function.  According  to  Acharya  and  Keller  (2008),  a  sector-
specific approach is recommended to solve the criticism posed by Coe et al. (1997) and Xu 
and  Chiang  (1999)  when  knowledge  is  transferred  via  trade  flows  without  losing 
information  on  the  general  structure  of  the  manufacturing  sector.  Hence,  the  first 
preliminary  adjustment  to  be  considered  is  accounting  for  sector-specific  technology 
stocks and import flows as follows: 
 
          (14) 
 
where    is  according  to  the  OECD  classification  based  on  the  technological 
content of each k-th sector (OECD, 2008) as described in Table A1 in the Appendix A.14 In 
this way, we do not assume a priori that only certain types of traded goods are more likely 
to diffuse technology. Nonetheless, we can still control for divergent effects played by 
different sectors when they are considered separately.15 
We  will  consider  the  first  ancillary  condition,  economic  similarity.  Los  (2000)  and 
Frenken  et  al.  (2007)  propose  adopting  an  index  that  captures  the  technological 
relatedness between industrial sectors by computing the similarity between two sectors’ 
input mix from input-output tables. Since data availability on input-output information at 
sector level is rather limited for developing countries, an alternative solution is to form a 
similarity matrix based on specialisation indicators (Van Stel and Nieuwenhuijsen, 2004). 
Following  this  strategy,  economic  similarity  is  thus  here  approximated  by  the  export 
specialization patterns at the aggregate level for k sectors. In turn, export specialization 
patterns are identified by a specialization index   where   represents 
export  flows  for  each  k  sector  for  each  country  z.16  On  this  basis,  the  final  economic 
similarity matrix will provide sector-specific bilateral weights ( ) in the form 
                                                 
14 All trade data are based on ISIC Rev.3 classification at 3 digit level, and they have been extracted from 
UN-COMTRADE.  According  to  Mayer  (2001),  as  a  standard  procedure,  bilateral  relations  between 
developing and developed countries are treated on the basis of mirror trade data, i.e. exports from developed 
countries to developing countries are considered as imports to developing from developed countries. The 
reason is that the availability and reliability of import data of many developing countries is rather poor, 
leading  to  biased  estimations.  All  trade  data  are  computed  as  two-year  average  values  to  reduce  the 
variability of the statistical procedures. 
15 Since there are different measures of innovation efforts which may be used for computing the foreign 
technology stock, we have considered two widely diffused indicators - R&D expenditures (Coe et al., 1997, 
2009;  Keller,  2009)  and  the  number  of  patents  (Bottazzi  and  Peri,  2003;  Madsen,  2007;  Malerba  and 
Montobbio, 2003; Ulku, 2007). More specifically, we have collected data on R&D expenditures and the 
number of patents for the time span 1996-2007 for the 26 developed economies in the 19 manufacturing 
sectors described in Table A1. See Appendix B for a brief explanation of the approach. 
16 All trade data are again based on ISIC Rev.3 classification at 3 digit level, and they have been extracted 
from UN-COMTRADE. In this case, we have not considered mirror trade data since export data are also 
reliable for developing countries when aggregated flows (and not bilateral ones) are considered. Note also 
that the data used are two-year average values.   15 
 
          (15) 
 
where 86 developing importing countries   and 26 developed exporting countries 
 are listed in Table A2.17 The resulting foreign technology transferred to each z-
th developing country consists of:18 
 
        (16) 
 
With  regard  to  the  consistency  condition  between  the  technological  content  of  the 
imported  goods  and  the  development  level  of  the  receiving  country,  we  test  if  the 
knowledge stock produced by different sectors classified in terms of their technological 
content has heterogeneous effects on development achievements. While the adoption of a 
national and sector-based innovation system approach is well established for advanced 
economies,  it  is  sparely  applied  to  developing  countries  (Lundvall  et  al.,  2006;  Viotti, 
2002).  Nonetheless,  Castellacci  (2008)  has  clearly  shown  the  sector-specific  nature  of 
innovation,  as  a  direct  consequence  of  the  path-dependent  nature  of  the  process  of 
technological knowledge accumulation. For this purpose, we identify four categories in a 
sort  of  technology  ladder  by  aggregating  our k  manufacturing  sectors  into  High  (H), 
Medium-High (MH), Medium-Low (ML) and Low (L) technology categories, as proposed 
by OECD classification (see Table A1).19 Our foreign technology variable results as: 
 
             
  (17) 
              
                                                 
17 It is worth noting that eq. (15) does not fully replicate the similarity condition proposed by Los (2000) 
whose weight matrix was based on a multiplicative form rather than on a pure similarity index. We have 
checked for robustness with the former weighting matrix in our empirical formulation and results seem 
stable whereas the multiplicative formula only reduces the coefficient values. 
18 In this case, we have chosen an un-weighted sum of sectors as the aggregative criterion since the degree 
of consistency of the imported technology to the domestic absorptive capacity has already been taken into 
account in the export similarity matrix. In other words, giving a higher weight to those sectors with a lower 
technological contents requires a subjective assumption on the relevance of sector-specific technological 
transfer. Conversely, when the internal consistence between the two economic systems is adopted  – as 
implicitly assumed in the export similarity matrix – there is no a priori assumption influencing development 
performances.  It  is  worth  noticing  that  from  the  assumption  of  zero  domestic  efforts  in  technological 
innovation adopted earlier, we are estimating the impact of technology produced in a set of countries that 
does not overlap with our country sample. This means that no South-South technology transfer is allowed 
which could result in a more stringent assumption especially for selected geographical areas. Nonetheless, 
the empirical methodology here proposed will hardly find enough information to tackle this issue. 
19 We are aware of the existence of several classification criteria for sectoral patterns of innovation inspired 
by the seminal taxonomy proposed by Pavitt (1984), but in this paper a strong requirement on matching 
trade and innovation data also for developing countries forced us to rely on the OECD (2008) approach.   16 
 
Finally, the importance of the indirect impact of the institutional quality condition is 
modelled by weighting   by the institutional quality of the z-th importing countries as 
defined by equation (14). It should be mentioned that, in the empirical section, the role of 
institutions will be examined both jointly and separately from the economic similarity 
condition. 
Table 1 gives a synthesis of the various definitions of technology transfer, highlighting 
that  its  role  will  be  tested  under  different  research  hypotheses  resulting  in  different 
explanatory variables where the number in parenthesis in each acronym refers to the use 
of patents (1) or R&D (2) (see Appendix B). For each variable, we have also computed 
separate measures related to the four aggregated sectors in order to test the consistency 
condition. 
 




4.4. The econometric strategy 
Our sample includes 86 non-OECD countries (Table A2) between 1996 and 2007. As far 
as trade relationships are considered, the choice for the temporal dimension is justified by 
considering that economic integration in the global market for developing countries has 
faced a strong impulse from the entry into force of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 1995.20 When a full HD index is considered as eq. (11), the final model is as follows: 
 
  (18) 
                                                 
20 We should also note that the new ISIC Rev. 3 classification for international trade flows starts exactly in 
1996, leading to some difficulties in treating trade data before that date combined with other sector specific 
information such as technology. The end date (2007) of our dataset allows us to reduce the potential bias 
deriving from using patents granted by application year as explained in Appendix B. Since patents are 
granted with 3-5 years delay from the moment they were applied, decreasing trends for the period 2008-
2010 should be ascribed mainly to computational issues rather than to a structural trajectory.   17 
 
if we consider only the direct impact of institutions whereas it is: 
 
  (19) 
 
when  we  investigate  the  indirect  impact  of  institutions  via  technology  transfer  (the 
interaction term). When the country sample includes developing countries, it is a standard 
assumption to replace the variable related to labour force ( ) with the total population 
( ) since labour market statistics for those countries are hardly reliable, especially in a 
time series perspective. Finally, the role of the public sector ( ) and the availability of 
technological  infrastructures  ( )  replace  investment  capital  as  proxies  of  a  broader 
economic environment. 
When the second HDI index is considered as in eq. (12), income per capita is included 
in the means of human well-being as in Ranis et al. (2000), and equations (19) and (20) 
become: 
 
  (20) 
 
  (21) 
 
where    represents  income  per  capita  that  has  a  possible  impact  on  health  and 
education achievements.21 
The econometric strategy adopted relies on a dynamic panel data estimation based on a 
standard Error Correction Model, such as the recently developed system GMM (sys-
GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). The main difference between sys-GMM 
and difference GMM (diff-GMM) is that sys-GMM estimates the system of the level and 
first-difference  equations  using  the  lagged  levels  of  the  series  as  instruments  for  the 
difference series, and the lagged difference of the series as instruments for the level series. 
Diff-GMM,  on  the  other  hand,  only  estimates  the  first-difference  equation  using  the 
lagged levels of the series as instruments; furthermore, it has finite sample bias and poor 
precision when the series are persistent. As shown in Blundell and Bond (1998), when N is 
sufficiently larger than T, as in our case, there are significant efficiency gains in using the 
system rather than the diff-GMM.  
Furthermore, a dynamic panel estimator in the form of a GMM is appropriate when the 
dependent variable is rather persistent over time, which is also our case (Wooldridge F-
test  equal  to  129.86***,  and  67.51***  for  HDI1  and  HDI2,  respectively,  with  = 
absence of autocorrelation of the residuals rejected).22 Finally, according to Bond et al. 
(2001), this choice is highly recommended when the value of the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent  variable  using  a  sys-GMM  (0.91***)  is  in  between  the  values  of  the  same 
coefficient estimated with fixed effects as the lower bound (0.82***) and OLS as the upper 
bound (0.99***) while diff-GMM gives an underestimation of the coefficient (0.62***) 
                                                 
21 It is worth noting that the domestic technology dimension disappears from all equations, as a common 
assumption since innovation efforts in most developing countries are negligible (Lall, 2000). 
22 Coe et al. (2009) suggest using dynamic panel estimators in a VAR context when non-stationarity and 
cointegration may be a concern. In our case, all panel unit roots tests performed on our variables reject the 
hypothesis of a random walk.   18 
which is what we actually verify performing these estimations on the model reported in 
Table 2, Column 5, here shown in parenthesis only for the lagged dependent variable.23 
Since our country sample is quite heterogeneous and includes developing countries as 
well as emerging economies (excluding China), we have included geographical dummies F 
(i.e., countries located in South America, Africa, Asia), country group dummies H (i.e., oil 
exporting countries and emerging economies) – for reducing potential bias deriving from 
such heterogeneity – and year dummies U. Our final equations to be estimated are: 
 
     (22) 
 
      (23) 
 
         (24) 
 
      (25) 
 
 
4.5. The measurement of institutional quality 
A final remark is devoted to the design of a proper institutional quality dimension to 
include in equations (22) to (25). In this case, we have to deal with qualitative, rather than 
quantitative, indicators. For this purpose, several alternative indices have been proposed 
such as the Cost of Doing Business survey provided by the World Bank, or the Global 
Corruption Index provided by Transparency International, or the Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI). In this paper we make use of the Political Risk Services Index (PRI) 
provided by the PRS Group, since it provides a homogeneous set of indices measuring 
various  dimensions  of  political  and  socio-economic  conditions  for  a  large  number  of 
countries and for a long time span. Our final institutional quality index is defined by the 
simple average of the normalized values of government capability ( ), corruption ( ), law 
and order ( ), and ethnic tensions ( ). This yields a general institutional quality (I) index 
formally expressed as: 
 
      (26) 
 
The   index is in the range [0,1], i.e. a dimension comparable to that calculated for 
the technological infrastructures ( ) and HDI indices.24 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
                                                 
23 For the sake of simplicity, we have not reported results on the validity of the chosen estimator, but they 
are available upon request from the authors. Bond et al. (2001) test the robustness of this methodology on an 
economic convergence framework, revealing that sys-GMM provide greater accuracy in those exercises. 
Ulku (2007) shows that sys-GMM estimators are also more preferable when innovation and technological 
spillovers are tested as potential drivers of economic growth. 
24 See Appendix C for further details.   19 
5.1. Technology transfer and economic similarity  
The first result in our paper comes from investigating the impact of technological transfer 
on  the  two  definitions  of  HDI  introduced,  by  experimenting  various  definitions  of 
technological  transfer.  Table  2  reports  the  results  for  HDI1.  Some  points  are  worth 
noting. First, regression (1) reveals that the measure of technological transfer via trade 
based on the sum of bilateral imports weighted by the geographical distance (TT) is not 
statistically significant. To some extent, this implies that trade per se is not sufficient to 
convey the technological transfer that is needed for human development achievements. 
Second, this outcome suggests that the measurement of technology transfer should be 
refined, in particular, to consider the sum of the sector-based technology transfer – still 
weighted only by bilateral import shares – where the knowledge stock is alternatively 
computed on the basis of patents (subscript (1)) and R&D expenditures (subscript (2)). 
This is done, respectively, in regressions (2) and (3), but again, technological transfer, 
whether  conveyed  by  patents  or  R&D,    is  not  able  to  affect  human  development 
significantly. 
This leads, and this is the third point, us to consider whether some of the ancillary 
conditions  that  have  been  discussed  above  (economic  similarity,  consistency  condition  and 
institutional  quality  condition)  may  play  some  role  in  shaping  the  impact  of  technology 
transfer. We will first consider economic similarity. The logic is that while absolute and 
trade-related technology do not matter (regressions (1) to (3)), relative trade may matter if 
trading partners have a close degree of economic specialization (regressions (4) and (5)). 
Indeed, when the definition of technology transfer is weighted by the economic similarity 
matrix, a positive and significant impact on human development emerges only when the 
knowledge stock is measured by patents ( ). 
Fourth, the absolute impact of institutional quality on HDI – at this stage included as in 
equation (22), i.e. with an autonomous coefficient – is highly significant in all cases. This is 
a  first  evidence  that  formal  key  institutional  variables  are  extremely  important  in 
supporting human development achievements; modelling them as an autonomous impact 
reveals that their positive effect is independent of the specific measure of technological 
transfer adopted. To some extent, it is also confirmed that, under certain circumstances, 
institutions may “trump everything else” as a determinant of development (Pande and 
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Table 2 – The impact of technological transfer on HDI1 
 
Notes: Two step robust specification has been used. **, *** significant p-value at the 5%, 1%, respectively. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are tests – with distribution N(0, 1) – on the serial correlation of residuals. Sargan Chi-sq test for over 
identification of restrictions. 
 
What we cannot know yet – and this will be discussed later – is whether institutions 
help the transmission of technology. For the moment, however, institutions seem to be a 
necessary autonomous condition for development. This outcome is also reinforced by both 
the positive (even though smaller in size) and significant impact of government consumption   21 
–  that  suggests  that  public  spending  may  further  encourage  human  development 
achievements through concentration of resources on health, education and other social 
fields – and by the positive impact of the infrastructural endowment, that has, on average, a 
magnitude  as  important  as  institutions  in  determining  human  development 
achievements.25 
A natural question to ask is whether the previous results depend on the inclusion of 
income in the dimensions of human development. We may well suspect that since income is 
an  important  element  of  HDI1,  one  of  the  following  two  assumptions  is  true:  if 
explanatory variables have no impact on income, this leads to a “no impact” on the overall 
measure of human development or, if explanatory variables have a positive impact on 
income, this leads to a “positive impact” on the overall measure. To deal with this issue – 
and  to  focus  on  the  most  essential  features  of  human  development  –  we  repeat  the 
regression exercise with HDI2 in Table 3. 
It is particularly important to note that almost all results are stable. As before, trade 
per se and the measurement of technology transfer based on the bilateral import shares 
have no impact (regressions (1) to (3)). Instead, it is confirmed that   has an impact 
that  also  spreads  across  non-income  dimensions  of  development  (regression  (4));  this 
result  is  also  extended  to  ,  i.e.  to  the  case  in  which  the  knowledge  stock  is 
measured by R&D (regression (5)). Unlike HDI1, the knowledge stock – when weighted 
by  economic  similarity  –  positively  influence  non-income  dimensions  of  development, 
regardless of whether it is measured by patents or R&D. A possible explanation is that the 
innovation output embodied in patents may be a more robust driver for economic growth 
since patents may better convey a knowledge transfer that requires setting procedures, 
rights and legal relationships that may facilitate local development. On the contrary, R&D 
is less easily transferrable into the production process, especially if proper human capital 
skills  are  not  available,  and  it  may  well  be  associated  with  developing  pro-poor 
technologies. 
Furthermore,  as  before,  institutions,  government  consumption  and  infrastructural 
endowments  have  a  significant  absolute  impact  that  overcomes  the  specific  measure  of 
technology transfer. At the same time, income per capita does not necessarily favour health 
and educational achievements once its role is isolated from the dependent variable. This is 
consistent with findings by Ranis et al. (2000), revealing that a lopsided vicious circle may 
often be detected, where countries that grow the most are those with lower health and 
education attainments. 
There is therefore some preliminary evidence that economic similarity is an important 
ancillary condition for conveying the positive impact of technology transfer on human 
development  achievements  and  that  institutions  are  an  autonomous  condition  of 
development. It is less clear, on the other hand, whether knowledge stock is best measured 
by patents or R&D spending, even though patents seem to be a more promising vehicle. 
However, in all cases, the previous outcomes suggest focusing exclusively on measures of 
TT weighted by the economic similarity matrix. 
 
 
                                                 
25 In order to reduce the endogeneity problems related to the fact that higher human development levels 
may conceive to better institutions as well as to higher absorptive capacity of the imported technology, we 
have considered those variables representing the quality of institutions, the technology transfer, the role of 
public sector and technological infrastructures as endogenously determined, by instrumenting them with 
the usually adopted two lags structure.   22 
Table 3 – The impact of technological transfer on HDI2 
 
Notes: Two step robust specification has been used. **, *** significant p-value at the 5%, 1%, respectively. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are tests – with distribution N(0, 1) – on the serial correlation of residuals. Sargan Chi-sq test for over 
identification of restrictions. 
 
 
5.2. Technology transfer and sector-specific consistency 
While giving strong evidence that the first ancillary condition of economic similarity may 
have a significant role in driving technological transfer, the previous analysis does not 
disentangle whether the technological content of the traded goods in different sectors may   23 
have  an  independent  explanatory  power.  This  argument  is  related  to  the  ancillary 
consistency  condition  discussed  in  paragraph  4.3  and  may  have  particularly  important 
implications  for  the  identification  of  sector-specific  policies  to  encourage  human 
development achievements. 
To  verify  the  power  of  this  condition,  Tables  4  and  5  (for  HDI1  and  HDI2, 
respectively)  replicate  the  previous  analysis  by  introducing  sector-specific  measures  of 
technological transfer weighted by the economic similarity matrix, leaving the modelling 
of institutions unchanged (absolute impact). For this purpose, we use the four technology 
sectors identified in equation (17), i.e. high (H), medium-high (MH), medium-low (ML) 
and low (L) technologies. 
As before, the four measures of TT embody the alternative calculation of knowledge 
stock by patents or by R&D expenditures. Considering first HDI1 (Table 4), trade on 
goods with high and low technological content has a significant impact. To some extent, 
this  outcome  confirms  the  expectation  that  the  diffusion  of  technology  may  not  have 
homogeneous effects on different sectors and that technology transfer depends on the 
country’s relative capability. According to our results, human development achievements 
would be favoured most by importing goods with high and low technological content. 
With regard to the former, we can deduce that goods with high technological content may 
have  both  a  direct  impact  on  income  levels  and  an  indirect  impact  on  health  and 
educational achievements that boost human development. This group of goods includes 
sectors  with  both  the  highest  potential  direct  impact  on  economic  growth  and  the 
potentially  larger  contribution  to  health  and  education  achievements  (e.g., 
pharmaceuticals, bio-technologies and ICT). 
With regard to the positive role of goods with low technological content, the result is 
hardly surprising since the specialization structure of developing countries is often biased 
towards manufacturing sectors as food industries and textiles. Hence, the likelihood that 
imported technology may be adapted for local use is higher if its technological content is 
consistent with the domestic propensity to use it. This may justify, to some extent, why 
goods with an intermediate technological content (MH and ML) have a more ambiguous 
impact. 
As  before,  the  positive  and  significant  absolute  impacts  of  institutions  and  the 
infrastructural endowment on HDI1 are independent of the sector-specific measure of 
technological  transfer  whereas  government  consumption  seems  more  decisive  in  the 
regressions involving H and MH technological content. 
The most interesting issue in Table 5 – replicating the previous analysis for HDI2 – is 
that the sector-specific measures of technological transfer are now all significant when 
knowledge stock is measured by patents. In other words, by excluding income from the 
measurement  of  human  development,  the  intensity  of  technological  transfer  does  not 
depend on the specific sector in which goods are traded. To some extent, this outcome 
contradicts the expectation – previously discussed – of an heterogeneous impact of the 
technological  content  among  different  sectors.  This  contradiction,  however,  is  only 
partial. A comparison of Tables 4 and 5 implicitly reveals that when income is included, 
the impact of the ancillary condition of economic similarity depends on the specific sector in 
which  goods  are  traded;  when  non-income  dimensions  of  human  development  are 
considered, on the other hand, economic similarity seems to have a more powerful impact. 
Nonetheless, for HDI2 as well, the coefficients for sectors with high and low technology 
are those with the highest impact, about twice as many coefficients as the closest group (H 
vs. MH and L vs. ML).   24 
It is finally worth noting that, in all cases, the absolute impact of institutions and that of 
the infrastructural endowment is positive and statistically significant, with a fairly stable 
value  of  the  estimated  coefficients.  To  some  extent,  therefore,  institutions  matter  for 
development,  and  their  impact  is  again  independent  of  the  measure  of  technological 
transfer embodied in the trading process. 
 
Table 4 – The impact of sector-specific measures of technological transfer on HDI1 
 
Notes: Two step robust specification has been used. **, *** significant p-value at the 5%, 1%, respectively. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are tests – with distribution N(0, 1) – on the serial correlation of residuals. Sargan Chi-sq test for over 
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Table 5 – The impact of sector-specific measures of technological transfer on HDI2 
 
Notes: Two step robust specification has been used. **, *** significant p-value at the 5%, 1%, respectively. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are tests – with distribution N(0, 1) – on the serial correlation of residuals. Sargan Chi-sq test for over 
identification of restrictions. 
 
 
5.3. The relative impact  of institutional quality on technology transfer 
The path of the econometric analysis followed so far gives some preliminary conclusions: 
a) trade per se and unweighted measures of technology transfer are not fundamental to 
shaping human development; b) the introduction of economic similarity (the first ancillary 
condition)  seems  fundamental  to  non-income  achievements;  c)  this  condition  would 
partially stimulate income and non-income human achievements, in particular only when 
goods have high and low technological content, which means that the second ancillary   26 
condition, the consistency condition, may help to explain which type of sector plays the 
major role for human development achievements; d) the absolute impact of institutions is 
always significant and positive and is a first support to the institutional quality condition 
(the third ancillary condition). 
This  set  of  outcomes  suggests  that  further  investigation  of  the  role  of  institutions 
along the lines of equations (23) and (25) is required, i.e. by interacting the institutional 
quality  index  with  the  measures  of  technological  transfer.  This  is  done  in  Table  6, 
following two alternative methods. 
 
Table 6 – The role of institutional quality 
 
Notes: Two step robust specification has been used. **, *** significant p-value at the 5%, 1%, respectively. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are tests – with distribution N(0, 1) – on the serial correlation of residuals. Sargan Chi-sq test for over 
identification of restrictions. 
 
The first is to weight the sector-based technology transfer only by the institutional 
quality index excluding economic similarity ( ); the second is to jointly weight the 
sector-based  technology  transfer  by  institutional  quality  and  economic  similarity 
( ). Both methods will give information on the relative impact of institutions as a   27 
vehicle for facilitating technological transfer; in turn, this requires removal of the absolute 
impact of institutions (measured by its autonomous coefficient). 
If we first consider HDI1 (regressions (1) to (4)), we can appreciate that when using 
patents as a measure of knowledge stock, the results obtained when using only economic 
similarity (regression (4) of Table 2) are confirmed. However, to some extent, regression 
(1) in Table 6 suggests that institutions may replace the possible absence of economic 
similarity among trading partners, leading to a positive impact of technological transfer 
on human development.  
When using R&D, the role of institutions appears even more powerful. This measure 
of knowledge stock does not produce any impact on HDI1 when only economic similarity 
is  considered  (regression  (5)  in  Table  2)  whereas  the  introduction  of  institutions 
determines  a  positive  and  significant  impact  of  technological  transfer.  In  this  case, 
institutions seems to be a necessary condition for a positive impact of technological transfer 
on  human  development  achievements.  If  economic  similarity  is  removed  ( ), 
institutions work, but if institutions are removed, economic similarity does not work. This 
may be thought of as another way of supporting the Rodrik et al. (2004) conclusion that 
“institutions trump everything else” for development. Even though in our case economic 
similarity may still have some impact, institutions seem to represent a sufficient condition 
for imported technology to influence the development path. 
Thus,  for  HDI1,  both  the  absolute  and  the  relative  impact  of  institutions  assume 
relevance.  Institutions  may  help  create  and  facilitate  the  absorption  and  diffusion  of 
technological  innovations.  For  HDI2,  on  the  other  hand,  things  are  simpler;  the 
introduction of institutions simply confirms the outcomes already obtained in Table 3 
(regressions (4) and (5)) when only economic similarity is included with both patents and 
R&D. 
The  final  step  is  to  investigate  what  we  gain  by  using  sector-specific  measures  of 
technological transfer. This is done in Table 7 using the most comprehensive measure of 
technology transfer, weighted by both economic similarity and institutional quality, and 
referring to the knowledge stock measured by R&D expenditures. We have chosen to 
focus on this dimension in order to verify whether a sector-specific impact occurs, taking 
the technology domain where the results were less robust (Table 2, column (5)). 
The results are therefore directly comparable with those reported in regressions (5) to 
(8) in both Tables 4 and 5. The most striking result now is that the institutional quality 
condition overcomes the consistency condition. In other words, the interaction of institutions 
with the measure of technology transfer makes it less relevant to shifting trade towards 
goods with a specific technological content since the technological content of goods in all 
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Table 7 – The role of institutional quality with sector-specific measures of TT 
 
Notes: Two step robust specification has been used. **, *** significant p-value at the 5%, 1%, respectively. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are tests – with distribution N(0, 1) – on the serial correlation of residuals. Sargan Chi-sq test for over 




Trade per se is not a sufficient vehicle for catching opportunities from foreign technology  
and  transforming  them  into  development  achievements.  We  have  shown  that  more 
satisfactory results can be obtained when trade occurs among countries with a similar 
economic structure (economic similarity). This ancillary condition increases the likelihood 
that the technology embedded in exports is consistent with the absorptive capacity of the 
importing country. Furthermore, in an aggregate perspective, economic similarity seems 
to  be  particularly  important  for  non-income  dimensions  of  human  development.  This 
relevance  is  to  some  extent  confirmed  when  using  sector-specific  measures  of 
technological transfer: although the impact on HDI1 appears limited to goods with high   29 
and low technological content, the impact on HDI2 is more widespread. This implies that 
the  consistency  condition  may  be  overcome  by  the  economic  similarity  condition  in 
determining the factors most affecting non-income dimensions of human development. 
With regard to the third ancillary condition (institutional quality), there are a number of 
issues to note. First, institutional quality has a stable and robust absolute impact on human 
development, regardless of the specific weighting structure of technological transfer and 
regardless  of  the  way  in  which  knowledge  stock  is  measured  (patents  vs.  R&D 
expenditures). Second, institutional quality has a stable and robust relative impact, since any 
time  the  index  of  institutional  quality  is  used  to  weight  the  measure  of  technological 
transfer,  the  impact  is  positive  and  significant.  Third,  and  to  some  extent,  more 
importantly, institutional quality ‘trumps’ both the economic similarity and the consistency 
conditions.  In  the  former  case,  it  can  be  seen  that  by  removing  economic  similarity, 
institutions  are  able  to  produce  a  positive  impact  of  technology  transfer  in  a  greater 
number of cases, but by removing institutions, economic similarity is not always able to 
produce the same impact. In the latter case (consistency), it can be seen that institutions 
make the introduction of sector-specific measures of technological transfers less relevant, 
but  they  are  significant  when  the  technological  structure  is  weighted  only  by  the 
economic similarity condition. Thus, our results lead to the conclusion that to fully absorb 
technological  transfer  from  traded  goods,  the  relative  impact  of  well-functioning 
institutions  and  high  economic  similarity  may  be  decisive,  with  the  absolute  impact  of 
institutions,  government  consumption  and  infrastructural  endowments  playing  a 
fundamental  role  in  reinforcing  the  conditions  for  favouring  human  development 
achievements.   30 
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Appendix A: Sector classification and country list 
 
Table A1 – Classification of sectors and concordance with patent fields by IPC codes 
 
Notes: * The figures in the “Patent fields” column refer to the 46 fields where patents are classified by Schmoch et al. 
(2003) in order to match IPC codes and ISIC Rev.3 industrial sectors. 
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Table A2 –Country list 
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Appendix B: Computing the foreign technology stock 
 
1) The knowledge stock for each sector for patents – identified by the subscript (1) – is 
given by: 26 
        (A2.1) 
where   represents the number of patents produced by sector k in country   in year s, 
and  s  represents  an  index  of  years  up  to  and  including  year  t  (Popp,  2002),  whereas 
 is the decay rate. The decay rate requires a common assumption for all sectors 
and countries over a 12-year period, where a strong variance occurs in all fields (sectors, 
countries and time). This means that an average decay rate is an a priori assumption which 
may  be  valid  for  one  sector/country,  but  may  not  be  suitable  for  another.  Since  the 
estimations rely on a panel setting, we have assumed an average 30 per cent decay rate 
falling  in  the  range  of  10-50  per  cent  reported  by  the  literature  for  the  sectors  and 
countries here considered (Schankerman, 1998). We have taken patent granted by year, 
due to their greater capacity to proxy an innovation output related to R&D efforts (Artz et 
al.,  2010;  Thomas  et  al.,  2010),  especially  in  a  non-short  term  context  (Dahlin  and 
Behrens, 2005), or when different countries and macro-defined economic sectors (rather 
than  deeply  defined  sectors  or  firms)  are  under  investigation  (Dutta,  2010).  It  is  also 
assumed that the marginal benefits from patenting are at least equal to marginal cost so 
that  firms  apply  to  an  international  patent  office  only  for  economically  valuable 
inventions. Accordingly, only patents applied to EPO are considered (which are generally 
more expensive than patenting only in domestic patents offices), since EPO provides a 
uniform  application  procedure  for  individual  inventors  and  companies  seeking  patent 
protection in up to 40 European countries.27 
 
2) The knowledge stock for R&D expenditures – identified by the subscript (2) – is as 
follows: 
 
  (A2.2) 
 
given that the initial stock is measured by  , where g is the sector-
specific average annual growth rate of constant price R&D expenditures throughout the 
period and d = 0.15 is the standard depreciation rate for R&D-based knowledge stock 
(Keller, 2007). 
                                                 
26 Patents are counted and aggregated by grant year and are assigned to the industrial sector on the basis of 
the classification proposed by Schmoch et al. (2003) and Verspagen et al. (2004), referring to 46 industrial 
sectors, classified by using ISIC Rev.3, which are related to the International Patents Classification codes. 
We have condensed the original 46 sectors into the 4 macro-sectors used for the Annual OECD Technology 
Scoreboard Report, as described in Table A1 in Appendix A. 
27 Many empirical analyses actually rely on patents applied to the US Patent Office (USPTO). However, in 
this way, biased results are likely which overestimate the role of the US compared with other advanced 
economies. By considering only EPO patents, it is implicitly assumed that US firms apply for patent grants 
only for economically valuable inventions with a potential higher diffusion path.   37 
Appendix C: The institutional quality index 
 
Rather  than  using  the  original  index  as  provided  by  the  PRS  group,  we  rescaled  all 
elementary  indices  with  different  scales  to  a  common  range  0-1,  to  avoid  implicitly 
assigning  different  weights  to  different  dimensions.  Furthermore,  elementary  indices 
strictly  related  to  economic  dimensions  (e.g.,  financial  stability)  that  may  show 
endogeneity problems with the measures adopted for modelling technology transfer were 
excluded. This left six indices available for measuring institutional quality (government 
stability,  corruption,  law  and  order,  ethnic  tensions,  democratic  accountability  and 
bureaucratic quality). To get the more promising indicators of institutional quality for our 
analysis and to disentangle the absolute impact of institutional quality from any other 
additional  element,  we  directly  tested  their  impacts  on  the  dependent  variable  HDI 
according  to  equation  (22)  (excluding  the  technology  transfer  dimension  from  the 
explanatory  variables).  Only  four  out  of  six  indicators  were  statistically  significant, 
excluding  democratic  accountability  and  bureaucratic  quality  (see  Table  B.1).  This  four 
indicators were then combined as in equation (14). 
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Table C.1 – The impact of alternative measures of institutional quality on human development 
 
Notes: Two step robust specification has been used. **, *** significant p-value at the 5%, 1%, respectively. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are tests – with distribution N(0, 1) – on the serial correlation of residuals. Sargan Chi-sq test for over 
identification of restrictions. 